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Equilibrium Quits
More people quit their jobs when the economy is booming than when it is in a slump. 1 Most
quits are voluntary changes by employees from one job to a different (presumably more lucrative)
job. 2 If the business cycle is an across-the-board variation in the demand for labor, why should it
affect mobility?
One answer appeals to fixed wage rates: If wages for current employees are sticky but wages
for new hires are flexible, then we will observe increased demand for labor met by an increased
mobility. Of course, we need a good explanation for the wage rigidity and why it should be less for
new hires than for current employees.
This paper demonstrates that optimal contracting can generate the equivalent of wage
stickiness
—
provided we assume imperfect information on the part of the employing firms. We
construct model of contracting between workers and firms, where contracts act both to allocate
labor and to reallocate risk. Aggregate implications are derived from the individual optimum
contract problem faced by each firm/worker pair. 3 Parties are free to make wages and other
compensation as fixed or flexible as they desire. 4
The information restriction we examine is that firms are not informed about their workers'
outside opportunities. The importance of this information restriction is demonstrated through
1 The contemporaneous correlation between quits and GNP across the business cycle is .893 (Prescott ei
aL, [1983]).
2 Quits are cyclical, but unemployment among quitters is steady, and much too small to allow for significant
periods of unemployment among quitters (we are grateful to Robert Topel for this information).
3 The individual optimization problem is a special case of the one described in Kahn [1985]. Alternatively,
we could build an equilibrium model from the model of Ito [1984], and Ito [1986] to achieve similar results.
For another example of the use of macroeconomic equilibrium models of contracting with imperfect
information see Grossman, Hart, and Maskin [1983].
4 An alternate assumption is that, although wages are flexible, severance pay or penalties for quitting are
inflexible (Ioannidesand Pissarides [1983]). As we will see below, this assumption can also generate correlation
between quits and output.
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comparison of contracting equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric information. When the firm
is fully informed about outside employment opportunities workers receive complete insurance, and
the expected number of quits is independent of the business cycle. In the imperfect information
contracting equilibrium, the expected number of quits is positively correlated with economy-wide
output.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section I presents the individual contracting
problem. It begins with an intuitive model, showing that the contract wage schedule becomes flat
in the presence of a desire for insurance against risky outside opportunities. Then we derive the
characteristics of optimal contracts under more general contracting environments. Section II
establishes the aggregate implications for correlation between level of output and quit rates. In
Section III we relate our analysis to that of other authors and consider possible avenues for further
research.
I - THE INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTING PROBLEM
The Basic Example
A worker owns an indivisible unit of labor and lives for a single period. His preferences can
be described by the strictly concave expected utility function u(y) where y is his income.5 The
worker's productivity is stochastic and differs from firm to firm. Since the worker is risk-averse, he
is interested in reducing his risk through a contract with a firm. All firms are risk neutral; the worker
enters a relation with one before the productivity draws are realized. Let x be the worker's
productivity in the firm with which he signed the contract (his "inside productivity"), and let z
5 As the reader will see, it is easy (and natural) to extend the model so that the worker's utility can depend
on non-monetary characteristics of his job, including disutility of labor.
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represent his maximum productivity at another firm (his "outside productivity"). We assume that the
two are independently distributed on the interval [a,b], with distributions F(-) and G(-)
respectively.6- 7 Some of the theorems below will assume that the "hazard rates" f(x)/F(x) and
g(x)/G(x) are declining, where /and g are the density functions of F and G respectively. 8
The contract the worker signs specifies the wage w(x) he will receive as a function of inside
productivity. After the productivity shock is realized, the worker can either accept the contract wage
or quit and go to work at an outside firm for a wage equal to his outside productivity. Thus his
income is the larger of w(jc) and z. If the worker quits, the firm receives zero profits; if he remains
with the firm it receives x - w(x). Competition among firms causes them to offer contracts which
maximize the worker's expected utility subject to the firm expecting to make non-negative profits.
Formally, it must choose the function w(-) to maximize
|| «(max {h<;c),z}) dF(x) dG(z) ^
subject to
f(x-w(x))G(w(x))dF(x) z (2 )
Let k be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the expected profit constraint. Then the first-order
condition for the maximum is
6 The distribution of outside productivity G depends on the joint distribution of the worker's productivity
draws at the other firms. In Section II we will discuss this distribution in more detail.
7 In this paper, boom periods will be ones in which the worker's observed output (that is, his output at
whichever firm for which he ends up working) Is high, and recessions will be periods with low observed output.
This means that recessions will occur when both inside and outside productivity draws are low, while booms
occur when at least one of these draws is high. Correlation between these two draws could be incorporated
without seriously affecting our results.
8 Intuitively, the hazard rate is the probability that a worker's productivity is x given that he knows it is no
higher than x. We are assuming that this probability decreases with x. The restriction to negative hazard
functions is mild: f(q) need not fall; it simply cannot grow exponentially.
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u'Mx))Gtw(x)) + *(x-w(x))g(w(x)) - xGiwix)) = (3 )
As long as this first-order condition characterizes the outcome, it can be differentiated to yield the
following lemma: 9
Lemma: Contract wages increase with productivity, but less than one-for-one.
In other words, the worker's desire for insurance leads to a flattening of the wage schedule.
In this simple structure there is no way to prohibit the worker from quitting. To reduce the
likelihood that he quits when his inside productivity is high, the employer shares part of the product
with the worker in cases of high productivity. But the worker's desire for insurance means that the
worker's contract wage does not vary one-for-one with his inside productivity; he is partially insured
by having a less variable contract wage. If inside productivity rises while outside productivity remains
unchanged, then quits become less likely.
This simple example provides the basic intuition as to why contract wages are "sticky"—that
is, why they vary less than one-for-one with inside productivity. It also shows that expected quits are
correlated with draws of inside productivity. In Section II we show that wage stickiness is part of a
sufficient condition for quits to be correlated with output in the aggregate.
In this simple example it appears that the underlying problem is that employees cannot be
9 The flatness of the wage function depends on the first-order conditions being sufficient for the maximum,
and thus can only be guaranteed if the Lagrangian is quasi-concave. Otherwise, it can happen that, while the
first-order condition holds at every value of x, there is still a discontinuity in the wage function (where it jumps
from one local solution to another). On the other hand, the result that wages are increasing in productivity
does not depend on quasi-concavity—it holds as long as the profit function for the firm exhibits the single-
crossing property.
For the more general problem examined in the next sub-section, the Appendix provides sufficient
conditions for the first-order approach to yield the unique (and continuous) solution to the problem.
Analogous conditions can be provided for the problem examined in this sub-section.
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forced to remain with their initial firms-that ex post they will go out to other jobs if they prefer
them. The next section shows that even when workers can post performance bonds, optimal
contracts look much the same as they do here. The true underlying problem is not ex post
enforcement but asymmetric information: Workers know their own outside opportunities better than
their employers do.
Performance Bond Included
In this sub-section we derive the characteristics of the optimal contract when the contract
allows a worker to post an optimal performance bond. These properties will then be used in Section
II to determine when such contracts can lead to a correlation between quits and output in the
aggregate.
In the situation we described in the previous sub-section wage contracts are obviously
inefficient because workers are unable to commit to remain with a firm ex post. As in Harris and
Holmstrom [1982], the inability to commit not to leave a firm leads to contracts with less than
optimal insurance. If they could, these workers would like to arrange performance bonds to bind
themselves ex ante to work for the firm. Although formal bonds are only rarely observed, many
labor contracts achieve a similar effect through imperfectly vested pensions and other accrued
benefits which disappear once the worker leaves the firm. Rather than develop a multi-period model
which incorporates these accruals into effective bonds, we simply consider a one-period contract with
explicit bonds.
If the bond were set prohibitively high, the worker would never leave the firm. Even if there
were no limit to the level of bond the worker could post, a prohibitive bond would be suboptimal:
It is in the firm and worker's mutual interest ex ante to stipulate that the worker will leave the firm
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if his outside productivity is sufficiently high. Since only the worker knows his true outside
opportunities, the bond should not be a prohibitive hurdle: it should be set high enough to allow
the worker a certain level of pre-commitment, but not so high as to prohibit all mobility.
Moreover, just as the contract wage varies with the productivity of the worker, the contract
penalty for quitting should vary as well. In a multi-period model where accrued benefits depend on
previous experience and productivity is autocorrelated, the effective penalty for quitting does vary
with current productivity. In the spirit of guaranteeing that the contract has no constraints on it
other than informational constraints on outside productivity, we will consider the case where both
the wage w(x) and the penalty to be paid for quitting t{x) are allowed to vary with inside productivity.
(Of course t(x) could be a net transfer from the firm to the worker; then we would call it "severance
pay.") Alternatively, we could consider imposing a constant penalty t for quitting. 10
Now the worker decides whether to quit based on a comparison of the pay on the job w(x)
and the outside pay less the penalty from quitting z - t(x). Rather than working with the functions
w(jc) and t(x), it is analytically simpler and formally equivalent to work with t{x) and p(x) = w(x) +
t(x). Observe thatp(x) is the difference between the pay from the firm if the worker remains with
the firm and the (negative) pay he receives from the firm if he leaves; it therefore represents the
opportunity cost of quitting under the contract. A flattened opportunity cost function (that is, one
where opportunity cost rises less than one-for-one with productivity) is the analogue of wage
stickiness in this environment.
In the optimal contract the functions p(x) and t(x) are chosen to maximize
10 If t is constant then the lemma of the previous section continues to hold— i.e. the optimal wage will be
sticky. Constant t makes aggregate implications more difficult to determine. Nonetheless, some of our results
continue to hold. In particular, Theorem 6 below remains valid when contracts are restricted to constant t.
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ffu(m3x[p(xU) -t(x)) dF(x) dGiz) (4 )
subject to
f[(x-p(x)+t(x))G<p(x)) + t(x)(l-G(pix)))}dF(x) 2 (5 )
The interpretation is as follows: Given the realization of* the worker will receive w(x) = p(x) - t(x)
it' he stays with the firm and will pay t(x) if he leaves. Thus he will leave whenever z > p(x); i.e.
whenever his outside wage opportunity is greater than the opportunity cost of quitting. Given x, the
probability of his leaving is 1 - G{p(x)). n If he leaves, the firm's profit is the amount t(x) received
from the departing worker. If he stays the firm receives x in output and pays the worker w(x) = p(x)
- Kx).
Again, let k be the Lagrange multiplier for the firm's incentive constraint. The following are
the first order conditions for the optimal contract:
fu'(maji[px}-f)dG(z) = k (6 )
u'{p-t)Gip) - KG(p) - Kg(p)(p-x) = (7 )
given some positive k. For the rest of the paper we will assume that optimal contracts are
characterized by these first-order conditions. This assumption is not innocuous, since the problem
may be non-convex. However, a technical theorem in the appendix (Theorem A2) provides sufficient
conditions for quasi-convexity, so that the optimal functions t(x) and p(x) are uniquely determined
by equalities (6) and (7). The appendix also verifies that these sufficient conditions hold for the
examples examined at the end of the next section.
11 Thus, 1 -G{p(x)) is the probability of a quit conditioned on inside productivity. Note that this is not
the same as the probability of a quit conditioned on observed output, ex post. It is the behavior of the latter
probability that determines whether quits are correlated with output, as detailed below.
Equilibrium Quits
Theorem 1: An optimal contract exists. It strictly dominates the spot market (Le. the contract where
the worker is paid his observed productivity in all states of the world). In this optimal contract,
workers remain at their initial firms whenever they are most productive there. In addition they
remain at their initial firms in some cases in which their productivity elsewhere is higher.
Proof: See Appendix.
The first-order conditions given above show that, as in the pure wage contracts of the
previous sub-section, optimal contracts with asymmetric information 1) offer greater inducement to
more productive individuals to remain with the firm, to ensure fewer quits, and 2) provide less than
perfect insurance.
As in the simpler model, the firm arranges the optimal contract so that the high productivity
individual quits less often. To do so, contract wages increase with productivity at the initial firm.
However, the contract wage also acts as a safety net; given a high contract wage the employee is not
harmed by low draws of outside wage offers. The riskiness of outside productivity draws has less
effect on a worker who has drawn a high inside productivity than on one who has drawn a low inside
productivity: Conditioned on inside productivity, there is less variation in the income of a person
with high inside productivity, since he is less likely to quit. The optimal contract insures across
realizations of inside productivity by guaranteeing that the income in less risky outcomes lies between
the extremes possible in the riskier outcomes.
These ideas can be summarized through the following theorems:
Theorem 2: In an optimal contract the expectedfrequency ofquits conditioned on inside productivity,
1 - G(p(x)), decreases as inside productivity x increases.
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Proof: This theorem follows directly from Lemma 1 and the Corollary to Lemma 4 in the
Appendix. *
Theorem 3: On-the-job pay w(x) and the quit penalty t(x) are Increasing functions of inside
productivity.
Proof: This theorem is identical to Lemma 2 in the Appendix. *
THEOREM 4: The worker's total income, max {p(x)j } - t(x), is lowest when his productivity inside
and outside the firm are both minimum. It is highest when his productivity inside is minimum
but his productivity outside is maximum.
Proof: This theorem follows as a direct consequence of Theorem 3. *
II - AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS
In this section we investigate the aggregate implications of the contracts examined so far.
Our goal is to determine conditions such that optimal contracts yield pro-cyclical quits. To do so,
we need a more precise specification of the distribution of outside productivity. We assume that a
worker's possible jobs lie in N different sectors, in each of which his productivity is independently
and identically distributed according to the same distribution function F( •). The worker signs with
a firm in one of the sectors; if he quits he goes to work in the outside sector where his productivity
(and therefore his spot pay) are highest. Thus the distribution of his outside pay if he quits is
G{) = FN~\')
(Note therefore that a declining hazard rate for F implies a declining hazard rate for G.)
One might expect that the contract described in the previous section would automatically lead
9
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to a correlation between quits and output. Although it is easy to demonstrate based on any flattened
contract that there is an inverse correlation between inside productivity and quits, the link between
quits and ex post output (which will sometimes be output at the old firm and sometimes at the new
firm) is more subtle. Let q denote an individual's observed level of output ex post. Since he will
quit whenever his outside wage is greater than the opportunity cost of quitting we see that:
q(x,z) =
x if p(x) > z
z if p(x) < z
(8)
Figure 1 illustrates how we find the probability of a quit given observed productivity. Points
in the box represent draws of (x,z) pairs. Since the worker quits whenever z > p(x), points above
the p(x) locus represent (xj:) draws which result in a quit. Suppose we observe ex post that the
worker has produced output q. Then we know that his productivity draw (x,z) must lie somewhere
in the set of outcomes shown in bold. If it is in the horizontal region, then the worker quit; if it is
z
X
10
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in the vertical portion of this set then he remained with the initial firm. Given q, the probability of
a quit Q is determined by comparing the likelihood of (x,z) lying in each of these regions.
In such an environment, under symmetric information each individual would migrate to the
sector in which he was most productive. If the economy allowed only spot wages, this migration
would arise from each sector's offering a spot wage equal to realized productivity. If firms could
offer complete ex ante insurance contracts, migration would still be efficient: the contracts would be
written to induce the worker to take the most productive offer ex post. 12 By the lid assumption
(N-\)/N of the time the most productive offer, ex post, is with a firm other than the initial
contracting firm. Thus, in this economy we would observe quits (N-\)/N of the time independent
of observed levels of productivity in the economy. Since workers are randomly paired with firms ex
ante (there is no way to know with which firm they are most likely to be productive), there is no
relationship between their realized productivity and the probability of a quit.
Contrast this with the effects of the private information contracts we have investigated. Is
there positive correlation between quits and output? It turns out that under the optimal contract,
quits increase with output whenever the opportunity cost of quitting increases less than one-for-one
with inside productivity. The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for this probability to be
increasing in q—i.e. that the aggregate level of quits is correlated with the aggregate level of output
in the economy.
THEOREM 5: Suppose F has a declining hazard function (Le. f(x)/F(x) Is a decreasing function ofx).
U P'ix ) < 1 in the optimal contract, then the expected number of quits increases with obser\'ed
12 Specifically, the firm will guarantee the worker his expected wage w. If the worker's outside productivity
is higher than vv the worker will quit, receive z from the new firm, and pay the original firm z - w. Note that
this is possible under symmetric information since the firm can verify the worker's outside productivity.
11
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level of output. 13
Essentially, this theorem requires that the optimal contract be "sticky"—i.e. that/7(x) increases
slowly relative to x. The proof of this theorem shows that this causes F{q) / F(p(q)) to increase.
Intuitively, it can be shown that this expression is the probability of a quit conditional on the
information that outside productivity is q and that inside productivity is less than q—that is, when
outside productivity is q and a quit would be efficient. In other words, the theorem requires that
contracts be structured such that the rate of inefficient retentions declines as outside productivity
increases.
We conclude this section with two examples where contracts satisfy the conditions we have
outlined. Calculations are relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 6: If F is a uniform distribution on [a,b] then an optimal contract satisfies the first order
conditions (6) and (7). Furthermore, quits and output are positively correlated.
This result holds for all concave utility functions and can easily be extended to cases of
heterogeneous populations. The proof of this theorem also holds if we restrict attention to contracts
where the penalty for quitting is constant.
13 Note that this theorem is really more general than it appears at first glance. In particular, even if
contracts are not formed as described in the previous section, there will be a correlation between quits and
output as long as F has a declining hazard function and/?(x) and F(x)/F(p(x)) are increasing functions ofx.
Under the optimal contract described in the previous section, this simplifies to the hypothesis given in the
theorem. Extensions of this result are examined in Kahn [1987].
12
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THEORHM 7: Suppose the worker has constant absolute risk aversion r. If the distribution function F
satisfies
4- \n(f(x)/F(x)) > -rexp{-r(b-a)}
ax
for all x in [a,bj, then an optimal contract satisfies the first order conditions (6) and (7), and
has p'{x) < 1.
In other words if the hazard function does not decrease too quickly throughout its range, the
contract is sticky, with opportunity cost increasing less than one-for-one with productivity. Recall
that Theorem 5 states that if the hazard function declines (at all), a sticky opportunity cost function
implies pro-cyclical quits. We can combine these two theorems:
Corollary: 14 If individuals have constant absolute risk aversion r, then there exists a positive number
L such that if F(-) satisfies
> — In
fix)
dx \F(x)
quits are pro-cyclical.
>
-L
III - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that in an economy with optimal employment contracting but imperfect
information about employees' outside offers there can be a positive correlation between aggregate
output and the quit rate, where this correlation cannot naturally be obtained under symmetric
information with flexible contracts. The following is an intuitive interpretation of this result. In this
economy, compensation performs two functions: First, it is part of an insurance scheme provided
14 Given L it is easy to generate distributions which satisfy the condition of this corollary. Its most
restrictive property is that it must have an atom at the bottom of the distribution. This poses no problem for
any of the theorems of this paper, which continue to hold with such an atom. Moreover, all the aggregate
results will continue to hold if that atom is smoothed out.
13
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by the contracting firm, and second, it serves as a signal directing the employee to the most
productive job available. These two functions conflict; the optimal contract is a compromise. Under
the optimal contract, workers tend to move on to higher productivity jobs should those jobs become
available, but they do not move as often as they would under perfect information. Income variability
is moderated by the contract, but not as much as it would be with symmetric information insurance.
As a result, we find in this economy some of the effects of a fixed-price contract. The wage
schedule is an increasing function of productivity in an optimal contract; however, the opportunity
cost of quitting increases less than one-for-one with inside productivity. To see this, consider the
extreme cases. When inside productivity is at the maximum, it is sub-optimal for the employee to
quit, since outside productivity cannot be greater. The optimal contract ensures that he does not
quit. In contrast, when inside productivity is at a minimum, the employee would always be more
productive elsewhere. Nonetheless the optimal contract does not lead him to quit always. Outside
spot wages entail a risk; for partial insurance against the risk the contract offers to retain the
employee with fixed compensation in some situations of low outside productivity, even though it
means the employee will remain with the firm when he would be more productive elsewhere.
Ceteris paribus, "good times" mean increases in both inside and outside productivity. But
when outside productivity increases, spot wages increase one-for-one. When inside productivity
increases, the opportunity cost of quitting (in the simplest contract, the wage) increases less than
one-for-one. The result is an increase in quits, on average, when productivity is high.
The major limitations in this analysis stem from the restrictions on the functional forms we
have used. We have limited ourselves to risk-neutral firms. A more desirable formulation would
allow the possibility that owners are risk averse (as, for example in Grossman and Hart [1983]) or,
equivalently, that liability is limited (as Kahn and Scheinkman [1984]). The form of distribution we
14
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have considered for productivity shocks is extremely restrictive. It would be worthwhile both to allow
more general functional forms for individual shocks (as in Kahn (1987]) and to drop the assumption
of independence across individuals, allowing for correlated aggregate fluctuations. An additional
desirable extension would handle production functions with diminishing returns to employment and
multiple periods, as in Ioannides and Pissarides [1983].
The other set of extensions worth considering would vary the set of permissible contracts.
For instance, in contrast to the article by Grossman, Hart, and Maskin, our analysis does not assume
aggregate variables are observable in sufficient time to make contracts depend on them. If this
possibility were included, then a natural extension would be to link real fluctuations in quits and
output with nominal shocks, as in Ball and Romer [1990].
We have structured this paper so that informational imperfections provide the only
limitations on the power of parties to contract. Many authors have emphasized other limitations to
the power to contract. Harris and Holmstrom [1982] emphasize restrictions on employee's ability
to make commitments. More recent work has examined the effects of both parties' inability to
commit not to renegotiate the contract (for a recent survey see Tirole [1990]).
In contrast to Prescott and Townsend [1982], we have not included randomized strategies in
the contract. In cases where the conditions for quasi-convexity do not hold, there will in general be
gains to the parties from the inclusion of such randomizations. (For an examination of these
possibilities see Tsoulouhas [1991].)
Thus many modifications to the set of permitted contracts would be of interest. Nonetheless,
we predict that none of these extensions will reverse our basic result, since none of them will in
general lead to symmetric information allocational efficiency.
15
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APPENDIX
Throughout this appendix we will assume that F is distributed on the interval [a,b] and has a positive
and continuous density function. The proofs also hold if the distribution has an atom at the left end
point.
We will consider a slightly generalized version of the problem in the text:
Problem A: Find measurable functions p( •) and t(-) to maximize
ff u(max{p(x),z) -t(x)) dF{x) dG{z) (
A1 )
subject to
f(x-p(x)+t(x))G(p(x)) + t(xKl-Gip(x))dF(x) z h (A2 )
for some constant h.
We can regard h as the firm's minimum profit level in some social welfare function.
Proof of Theorem 1 :
We will demonstrate through the use of several lemmas that without loss of generality p( •)
and /(
•) can be restricted to a bounded set of non-decreasing functions. Since such a set is compact,
existence follows along lines of the demonstration of Kahn [1992]. After proving existence we will
turn to the final two claims of the theorem.
Without loss of generality we can bound the function p{ •) as follows:
a <> p(x) <l b (A3 )
Ifp{x) < a in some otherwise feasible contract, then G(p(x)) equals zero, and the identical outcome
16
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can be attained by setting p(x) = a. If p(x) > b then G(p(x)) = 1 and the identical outcome can
be attained by decreasing/^*) to b and decreasing t(x) by the same amount.
Furthermore, it is clear that in any optimum, constraint (A3) will be binding. Let us define
u(pj) =
J
u(maj.{pj.}-t)dG(z)
n(xj},t) = t + G(p)(x-p)
Clearly, (o(p(x)j(x)) is the worker's expected utility, given his opportunity cost and penalty functions,
and Jt(x,p(x),t(x)) is the firm's profit given these same functions and the worker's observed inside
productivity. With these definitions we can simplify the problem as follows:
PROBLEM B: Find U(-),p(-)} to maximize
(u>(p(x),t(x))dF(x) (B1 )
subject to
JTi(xtp(x)Ax))dF(x) = h (B2 )
a <l p(x) <; b (B3 )
Lemma 1: In the optimal contract p(x) must be a weakly monotone increasing function.
Proof: The proof follows a variational argument; if p decreased between two points, then by
switching values ofp (and /) around those points, we could increase expected profit without affecting
utility. *
For each p( •) for which (B3) holds—and in particular for the optimal p( •)—we can consider
17
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the sub-problem:
Problem C: Find t( •) to maximize (Bl) subject to (B2).
Problem C is a convex problem with a unique solution for each/7. The first order conditions of this
problem imply that if t
x
is the solution when p(x) = /?, and t2 is the solution when p(x) = /?.,, then
fuXmnip^-tJdGiz) = fu'(mzx{p2j.\-t2)dG{z) (B4 )
Lemma 2: In any contract solving C (and in particular in a solution to B), p - 1 increases with p almost
everywhere (Le. w is increasing in p). Also, t increases with p a.e.
Proof: Without loss of generality let a < p x < p2 < b. Suppose t x > t2 . Then
max {pv z} - tx < max {p2,z} - t2 V z < p2
contradicting (B4). Similarly, suppose p x - t x > p2 - t2 . Then
max {O.z-pj} + (P
x
-t
x
) > max {0,z-p2 } + {p2 ~t2) V z > p x
contradicting (B4). A
We are now in a position to show that t is bounded, from which existence follows directly.
Lemma 3: In an optimal contract
h+2a-b<t(x)<h+2b-a (B5 )
Proof: From Lemma 2, | t2 -t x \ < b-a for any t x and t2 in a contract solving Problem C. But the
minimum / must be greater than a + h—otherwise expected profits are negative. Similarly the
maximum t must be less than b + h. Thus (B5) holds given any p( •) and in particular for the
18
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optimal p( •). 4
Having placed bounds on /(
•) and p( •), we know that the candidates for the optimum form
a compact set (see Kahn [1992]). Since by Lemmas 1 and 2 they are weakly monotone, existence
follows immediately. This proves the first claim in Theorem 1. /*
Lemma 4: In the optimal contract p(x) > x almost everywhere, so that workers never quit if x > z but
do not always quit if x < z.
Proof: Take a feasible contract \p('),t(-)} and a particular value x. Let n = jz(x,p(x),t(x)).
Consider replacing p(x) by some new value /;, while adjusting / so as to leave profit in state x
unchanged:
f = * - (x-p) Gip)
Assume u is differentiable (if not, simply use its right derivative in the following formulas). The
effect on expected utility of a change in p is:
do did did di
dp dp dt dp
- Gip)u'(p-t) - Gip)u'(p-t)+fu'{z-t)dG{z) (Gip) - (P-X)g(p))
= Gip)j{u'ip-t) - u\z-t))dG(z) - (p-x)g(p)ju'(m2x{pz)-t)dG{z)
The first term is always positive by the concavity of the utility function, and the second term is non-
negative when p < x. Thus, dojjdp is positive if p < x or if p = x and a < x < b. 4
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COROLLARY: The opportunity cost function p is increasing somewhere (more precisely it is not the case
that p is constant a.e.).
Proof: Lemma 1 shows that/? is non-decreasing a.e.. To show that it is increasing somewhere, note
that x < p(x) < b on (a,b). Therefore, there is no value c such thatp(x) = c a.e. on (a,b). *
Lemma 4 states that increasing p increases utility conditional on x without changing profits
as long as p is not greater than x. Therefore if p(x) < x for a non-negligible set of values x, then
the initial contract cannot be optimal, which proves the final claim of Theorem 1. «/
Finally, note that the behavior in a spot market is identical to a "contract" in which p(x) =
x and t(x) = 0. Applying the previous paragraph's result, such a contract is not optimal, proving the
second part of Theorem 1. *
Proof of Theorem 5 :
Using the definition given by (8) in the text, the probability of a quit conditional on q(x^) —
q is
q^ = g{q)F{p\q)) = P
fi.q)G{q) + g{q)F{p\q)) 1 + ^
where
P = F{p~\q))g(q) _ (AM)
f(q)G(p(q))
F(p-\q))
F(q)
Now, the second bracketed expression is increasing in q since
F(q) •\N-l
F(p(q))
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d F(q)
sgn ^— = sen
dqF(p(q))
/<*) &pm
pXq) >
F(q) F(piq))'
whenever p(q) > q and p'(q) < 1 (recall F has a declining hazard function). Likewise, the first
bracketed expression is increasing in q since
d F(p-\q))
Sgn
~a ^TT^
= Sgn
^7 F(q)
ttp^ . /to)
F{p-\q)) F(q)
>
Thus the probability of a quit for a single individual is correlated with his own output. *
Derivation of Sufficient Conditions for the First-Order Condition Approach to be Valid :
While Theorem 1 shows that an optimal contract exists, since the problem my be non-convex
it does not guarantee that the first order conditions (6) and (7) characterize the solution. Our goal
then is to find sufficient conditions for this to happen. To do this we reformulate the problem with
a Lagrange multiplier. Since the problem is not convex, there is no guarantee that the reformulation
is equivalent. However, we can establish:
THEOREM Al: {/( •),/?( •)} is an optimum contract if (a) there exists a number k such that for almost
all x E [a,b], {t(x),p(x)} is the unique solution to equations (6) and (7) of the text, and (b)
\ji(x,p(x),t(x))dF(x) = 0.
Proof: The contract is optimal if (b) is satisfied and if for almost all x, {t(x),p(x)} maximizes
ti>(pjt) - K*{x,P,t) (D1 )
Equations (6) and (7) are the first order conditions for maximizing (Dl). For almost all x the
maximum to (Dl) is interior so a unique solution to the first order conditions is sufficient for an
optimum. 4
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Thus, we must find sufficient conditions for the existence of k and a unique solution to
equalities (6) and (7) of the text. Recall that we use the variable w = p - t to denote the pay
received by the worker who remains with the firm. Given p and k, the following equation (a
transformation of equation (6) in the text) implicitly defines w(/?,/c):
b
{u'(w + inax[0,z-p})dG(z) = k (D2 )
We wish to use (7) in the text to define x(p), the inverse of the optimal schedule/?^). The following
technical theorem states sufficient conditions on preferences and distributions for the first order
approach to be valid:
Theorem A2: // the function
*(P) = P " ["W,k))-k] GWISW (D3)
K
is strictly monotonic on [a,b] for all k in [u' ~\h+2b-a), u' ~\h+a)], then there exists a k such
that in the optimal contract
p(x) = «- ! (x) <D4 )
KX) = P(X) - Mip(x),K) (D5 )
Proof: O is derived from (7); when it is monotonic there is a unique solution to (6) and (7).
Expected profits are continuous in k; they are negative for the minimum k in the indicated interval
and positive for the maximum k. Thus for some intermediate value of /c, the conditions of Theorem
Al are satisfied. 4
Proof of Theorems 6 and 7 :
Here we will apply conditions (D3)-(D5) to specific cases, generating conditions in which
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increased output correlates with increased quits.
Theorem 6: // F(x) = x/(b-a) (so that F is uniform on fa,bj) then <P is strictly monotonic so the
optimal contract is characterized by the first order conditions. In this contract quits are
correlated with output.
Proof: First note that f(x)/F(x) = \/(x-a), so F has a declining hazard function. Rewriting (D3)
we get
* (#0 . p + m + -«W)) CW
gip) K g(p)
Each of these terms is increasing in/? (note that since u is concave, -u is convex). Thus, by Theorem
A2 we can use the first order conditions. To show correlation between quits and output we calculate
the probability of a quit given ex post output and take the first derivative. As in the proof of
Theorem 5, we have
<M = g(q)F(p
l
(q))
f(q)G(q) + g{q)F(p-\q))
Substitution gives us:
<M = b-a b-a.
qN-a (q -a)u '{q -t)
b-a N-\ k(#-1)
b-a
yVT 1 N-\(q-a\N-2 1
K
b-a b-a \b-\ b-a
\qN-a _(q-a)u'(q-t)
N-\ k(N-\) )
K{qN~a)
- u>(q-t)
q-a
K +
K(qN-a)
q-a
- u'(q-t)
The derivative of Q has the same sign as the derivative of the numerator:
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K(^~a)
- uHq-t)
q-a
The derivative of the first term with respect to q is positive. Thus, dQ(q)/dq is positive if
**'«*-*
<
dq
Noting that q-t = w(j?~ l (q)) and recalling that w'(-) > (Lemma 2) completes the proof. *
Note that in the case where t is restricted to be constant, this proof is unchanged.
Theorem 7: If individuals have utility functions u(w) = -exp{-rw} and
4- hi[f(x)/F(x)] > -r exp{-r(b-a)}
dx
Then the optimal contract is characterized by the first order conditions. Furthermore, in this
contract p - x is decreasing (Le. p'(x) < \).
Proof: We will show that
-j-(p - 0(/?)) < 0, implying that O is strictly monotone, and thus that the
first order approach is valid. Moreover, it implies that p'(x) < 1 (recall that Q>(p) - x).
Analytically it is easier to consider the natural log of p - O (p) (since this is a monotonic
transformation it will not affect the sign of the derivative). Taking this derivative gives us:
dp 4 ln[iiWic))-ic] - -f todp dp
/au"Mp,k))
U'iwip^-K
— w(P,k) - —In
dp dp
*EL
- -ilnie
Gip)\ dp
(N-l)f(p)
F(p)
(El)
Simplifying condition (D2) above we see:
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k = u'{wipyK))Gip) + fu\w +z -p)dG(z) (E2)
This implies:
— In [p-Q(p)] = ^ — — w(/7,k)
Jp
«
/(h<^k))(1-G(/;)) - f u^+z-p^GCz) ^
In addition, if we totally differentiate (E2) we see:
/b ,
u'(w+z-p)dG(z)
— W<J>,K) = -*
dp k
dp
In
f(p)
F{p)
(E3)
(E4)
Substituting this back into (E3) we get:
dp
In [/>-*(/>)] =
-ru'(w(p,K))
r b J
I u (w+z~p)dG
J D
uXw(p,K))(l-G(p)) - (
b
u'(w+z-p)dG
J D
-ru'(w{p,K)) (
b
u'(w+z-p)dG(z)
J
_p
k'(h</mc))(1 - G(p))K
-r (
b
uXw+z-p)dG(z)
- * In
dp
f(p)
F(P)
(1 - Gip)) K
-ru'(w(a)+b-a)
«'(*(«))
+ r exp{-r(b-a)}
rexp{-r(b-a)}
=
dp
In
AP)
F{p)
(E5)
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